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BOOK REVIEW

Does Censorship Really Protect
Children?
Not In Front of the Children, "Indecency," Censorship,and the Innocence
of Youth, Marjorie Heins, New York: Hill and Wang, 2001, 402 pages.

Michael Grossberg*
Marjorie Heins spent much of her career as a lawyer battling
censorship with the American Civil Liberties Union. Today, she continues
the fight as Director of the Free Expression Policy Project of the National
Coalition Against Censorship. In an effort to understand the people who
work to constrict the free flow of information, she stepped out of the
trenches and into the library to do some research. Not In Front of the
Children is the result. In it, Heins analyzes what she argues are the
unexamined assumptions that support one of the most powerful weapons in
the arsenal of censors: the claim that certain kinds of information must be
banned to protect children from harm. She does so by chronicling the
persistent power of this assumption. From Plato to Tipper Gore, censors
have used child protection to legitimate bans on books, plays, music,
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scientific reference works, movies, comic books, and now Web sites.
Despite its venerable past, Heins challenges the logic and utility of the
"harmful to minors" censorship standard. Though she acknowledges the
state's legitimate responsibility to protect the physical and psychological
well-being of its youngest citizens, Heins contends that now, as in the past,
little evidence can be marshaled to support the assumption that indecent,
violent, or other proscribed material harm children in any significant way.
Consequently, she concludes that the costs of censorship in the name of
child protection far outweigh any demonstrable benefits, and it must
therefore be abandoned.
Not In Frontof the Children is an engaged and engaging brief against
censorship and for the informational rights of children and adults. Heins
develops her argument chronologically. The chapters proceed through time,
documenting the persistent use of the harmful to minors standard as a tool
of censorship. She attributes the first use of the tactic to Plato, who argued
that the young could not differentiate worthwhile from erroneous
information and thus had to be given only virtuous materials. She then
recounts the consistent appeal of the argument ever since by highlighting
key events in the history of censorship and their links to child protection.
Building on the work of social and cultural historians, she explains that a
new ideal of childhood emerged in Western Europe and North America
during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. This new view of children
revolved around the notion that children were distinct individuals, and
childhood should be a special, nurturing time. Childhood innocence in
particular came to dominate views of the young. As a result, child
protection took on a new meaning and importance, which paved the way
for it to become a policy trump card always available to those who would
restrict the free flow of information.
These developments were critical, Heins argues, because the new
views and anxieties about children coincided with heightened concern
about obscenity. Efforts by British and American legal authorities to devise
rules regulating obscene materials began in the mid-nineteenth century with
the English Hicklin rule, which banned material deemed likely to deprave
and corrupt impressionable minds. Heins traces the tortuous legal path that
resulted from the inherent difficulties of finding a broadly acceptable
rationale for censoring obscenity because of its clash with free speech
convictions. She demonstrates how those difficulties created an almost
irresistible temptation to rely on child protection as a way to legitimate
censorship.
In addition to adhering to the Hicklin rule, she explains that, in the
United States, a major policy turning point came in the 1870s, with the
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triumphant crusade of anti-vice entrepreneur Anthony Comstock. He
persuaded Congress to ban obscene materials from the mails, relying on
child protection as his chief argument. In a widely read polemic, Trapsfor
the Young, Comstock spotlighted the messages being sent to the young in
dime novels and other literature that he labeled prurient and condemned as
sources of corruption. Critically, he also maintained that these messages
were harming children and thus the Republic. Though in his time and later
Comstock was ridiculed as a humorless prig-playwright George Bernard
Shaw coined the term "Comstockery" as a label for mindless censorshipHeins insists that Comstock must be treated very seriously. His campaign,
she contends, laid the basis for modem censorship, particularly its
dependence on child protection for legitimization. Critical to her argument
is the contention that Comstock acted out of moral disgust but evidentiary
ignorance; he imposed his moral views on legislation without any evidence
to support his convictions.
Heins asserts that the subsequent history of censorship in name of
child protection has replicated the Comstock crusade. Time and time again,
she argues, the same pattern of action has emerged: social fears lead to
calls for censorship; child protection emerges as the most powerful
argument for restrictions; direct harm to the young is assumed but never
proven, yet the fear of harm to minors is sufficient to spur action. The
culmination of this process is censorship in the name of children. Chapter
after chapter in Not In Front of the Children document this policy evolution
by showing how new forms of popular culture-movies, television, comic
books, rock 'n' roll, the Intemet-became new sources of fear for the
young and therefore new objects of censorship. Heins also intimates that all
too often child protection has been deployed either cynically, to mask other
goals, or ignorantly, without evidence of actual harm to the young. In this
way, she narrates the history of censorship to demonstrate the intimate
connection between child protection and information control.
Not In Front of the Children concentrates on the last half century,
particularly the last couple of decades. Heins identifies the courtroom and
legislative chamber, particularly the federal courts and Congress, as the
central forums in debates about censorship. She explicates the twists and
turns of complicated legislation and legal doctrine with the verve and skill
of a lawyer building a case before a jury. She tries to place these legal
developments in an understandable context by detailing how demands for
action from parents, commentators, interest groups, and others vocal critics
of material labeled obscene or violent has led to repeated reliance on the
harmful to minors argument. She explains how advocates for restriction
have acted on the seemingly common sense assumption that materials on
controversial issues such as sexuality, drugs, alcohol, suicide, racism, and
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other troubling topics injure children even if no clear evidence of harm can
be provided by social scientists or other empirical investigators. Indeed, she
offers a careful analysis of the social science research to buttress her
contention that evidence of harm to children caused by these controversial
materials is lacking.
In each harm to minors case Heins documents how, in the clash of
common sense versus evidence, common sense always wins out.
To illustrate her point, she narrates cases such as the 1978 FCC v. Pacifica
ruling, which upheld a ban on broadcasting indecent or vulgar words on TV
or radio [based on alrplay of comedian George Carlin's seven dirty words
monologue], which relied on the harmful to minors standard. She pays
particular attention to the 1996 Communications Decency Act that made it
crime to send a minor any indecent Internet communication or to make
available to minors any online expression that might be considered
"patently offensive as measured by contemporary community standards."
When she worked for the ACLU, Heins actually participated in the
successful legal challenge to the Act, which convinced the Supreme Court
that the initiative was overly broad and would prevent useful information
about topics like birth control from reaching young people. In her intricate
but jargon-free analyses of cases and statutes, Heins makes it clear that she
thinks judges as well as legislators have succumbed to the power of the
harmful to minors rationale without demanding evidence. The result, she
argues, are state and federal policies that are both convoluted and
illegitimate. In their place she offers a clear standard: direct harm must be
proved or censorship must not be imposed.
Heins adds a spatial dimension to her assertion with a comparative
analysis. In a broad canvass of policies in other nations, particularly Britain
and Western Europe, she makes the case that American censorship policies
in the name of children are the most extreme, and suggests they are also the
most costly. Sex education, for instance, has been stymied by censorship in
the name of child protection, with horrendous results for children and the
larger society. Similarly, adult freedoms have been circumscribed more in
the United States than in any other nation, with the harmful to minors
standard as the chief culprit.
Embedded in Heins's analysis is her own unexamined foundational
assumption: the primacy of the autonomous individual and her or his right
to information with as few constraints as possible. This classically liberal
ideal permeates Not In Front of the Children. What makes her contentions
novel is a determination to extend those autonomous rights to children. She
seeks to expand on rights the Court gave youths in the 1960s and 1970s in
cases such as Gault and Tinker and through enactments such as the
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Twenty-sixth Amendment, which lowered the voting age to eighteen. Just
as political rights should not stop at the schoolhouse door, as those early
cases suggest, so too, Heins insists, should First Amendment rights not
begin at eighteen. Instead, she demands that young Americans be given the
right to intellectual freedom. Heins supports that cause by arguing that
young people have the skills to assess information in a thoughtful manner.
She also refutes policies rooted in notions that the young are simply putty
in the hands pornographers and others who would corrupt them. She thus
questions assumptions of intellectual immaturity as a legitimate basis for
the denial of First Amendment rights. Her faith in children to act as
competently as adults gives additional meaning to her contentions that no
evidence exists about the actual harm inflicted on minors by obscene and
violent behavior. Instead, she advances her own version of children as
victims: boys and girls who are deprived of information they need by over
zealous protectors who refuse to recognize their intelligence, competence,
and actual needs. This, Not In Frontof the Children makes clear, is the real
harm to minors. As Heins explains in her own words:
The argument here is not that commercial pornography, mindless
media violence, or other dubious forms of entertainment are good for
youngsters or should be foisted on them. Rather, it is that, given the
overwhelming difficulty in even defining what it is we want to censor,
and the significant costs of censorship to society and to
youngsters
themselves, we ought to be sure that real, and not just symbolic harm
results from youthful pursuit of disapproved pleasures and messages
before mandating indecency laws, Internet filters, and other restrictive
regimes. (p. 11)
Not In Frontof the Childrenis an impassioned work of scholarship. It
is based in a broad and thoughtful review of the relevant scholarship and
legal sources, and it is likely to be convincing to those who share Heins's
disdain for censorship. Indeed, it very well might stir those individuals to
action; the information marshaled in support of informational freedom is so
compelling it succeeds in suggesting that the bar must be raised much
higher for those who would rely on child protection to legitimate controls
on informational rights. However, the book reads so much like a lawyer's
brief that the very relentless manner in which the argument is presented
may lessen its persuasiveness to those who are less committed to
informational freedom, let alone to those who continue to champion
controls on information presented to American youths.
Furthermore, there are a few underdeveloped points in the book that
prevent Heins's argument from being as comprehensive as it could be. For
example, the proponents of censorship are presented in rather limited and
narrow ways. Their motivations are constantly questioned and they are
depicted as cynics or dupes. Their concerns for children are often
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trivialized without providing a broad analysis of the reasons for their
actions. In contrast, a recent study of the rise of the Comstock campaign,
included in sociologist Nicola Beisel's Imperiled Innocents, presents a
similarly critical analysis of censors who relied on child protection, but
does so by explaining their motivations in a more comprehensive manner.
Beisel focuses in particular on worries regarding lost class authority, which
led the upper class to fear for their young and try to protect them from
morally degrading material they thought contributed to the undermining of
elite power. Though Heins notes Beisel's argument, she does not develop a
similarly nuanced analysis of recent efforts to protect children through
censorship, thus the motivations of contemporary censors remain unclear.
Equally as important, Heins does not really come to grips with the
implications of her survey of the harmful to minors standard through time
and space. Apparently, everywhere she was able to examine through her
research, adults in one way or another feared for the young and turned to
some form of censorship to protect them. She concluded that people do this
not just in the United States but also in Britain, France, Japan, and
seemingly every other nation, and have done so for a very long time. Heins
thus reveals the universality and longevity of the impulse to protect the
young through censorship, but the implications of this are not analyzed
beyond the suggestion that the United States is the most extreme censor.
Perhaps the impulse to protect the young through censorship is indeed a
misguided response to change and an unwarranted policy toward the
young, but pointing out the evidentiary limitations and logical flaws of the
harmful to minors standard is not a substitute for thorough analysis of its
consistent, and persistent, appeal.
Similarly, Heins does not devote sufficient attention to the breadth of
the contemporary child protection impulse. Child protection from obscene
and violent material cannot be easily separated from protection from abuse,
market exploitation, and other forms of child saving. Yet Heins walls off
her analysis from the larger child protection movement and thus fails to
fully address the power of the harmful to minors standard. Surely some of
the standard's appeal and authority comes from its inevitable link to other
forms of child protection. Such realities about the harmful to minors
standard are important because they raise questions about how likely it is
that the changes Heins advocates will ever be realized.
Despite its analytical limitations, Not In Front of the Children is an
important and timely book. It forces us to think about the power of the past
to control the present, and it compels us to consider what obligations adults
have to the young and to each other as they make, debate, and enforce
policies controlling information access. Heins makes a compelling case that
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direct harm must be proven before censorship can legitimately be imposed.
As a result, her thought-provoking book provides new understanding to
current legal policies. This book warrants a broad reading and lively
discussion by all who are interested in state and federal communication
policies.
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